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Abstract 
The problem of the accumulation of capital in labor-managed firms and worker cooperatives 
has being attracting considerable attention among researchers. The Furubotn-Pejovich effect is 
considered to be the source of undercapitalization. The paper seeks to show that the presence of 
undercapitalization  is  due  to  a  specific form  of  reinvestment,  i.e.  the  reinvestment  of  self-
financed  capital  funds  in  indivisible  reserves.  The  introduction  of  divisible  reserves 
appropriable by worker-members at some point in time would be a valid measure with which 
to counteract the horizon problem and undercapitalization. However, in the formulation given 
to it by this paper, it engenders less widely-explored problems connected with the way in 
which net surpluses are distributed and reinvested, and with the reimbursement of individual 
capital quotas. When divisible reserves are present, cooperative bonds can be introduced to 
deal with the shortcomings due to capital variability and allow a better match to be achieved 
between the members’ and the firm’s objectives. Members can cash in their individual capital 
stake by selling it, while the firm does not immediately have to reimburse members’ quotas. 
However, the creation of a market for cooperative bonds is likely to generate risks of its own 
that again must be tackled appropriately. A minimum level of indivisible reserves will still be 
needed in order to stabilize the capital structure of the firm. The quota of the firm capital 
saleable in the form of cooperative bonds should be restricted. The sum of divisible reserves 
owned by incumbent members, and of indivisible reserves owned by the cooperative, should 
constitute a substantial part of its capital. Finally, a hierarchy of liabilities is required which 
prioritizes  the  reimbursement  of  debts  owned  by  parties  who  undergo  information 
disadvantages.   
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1. Introduction 
The problem of the accumulation of capital in labor-managed firms
1 (LMFs hereafter) 
has  been  widely  studied  in  the  specialized  literature.  Worker-members  in  LMFs  have  a 
truncated temporal horizon of permanence in the firm. When self-financed funds invested in 
the  firm  cannot  be  recouped  on  quitting  the  organization,  members  will  anticipate  the 
unrecoverability in their choices by reducing self-financed investments to an inefficient level. 
Most scholars tend to recognize the existence of a tendency to underinvestment. However, not 
all authors agree on the matter, and some prefer to treat it as substantially irrelevant. At the 
empirical level it is difficult to isolate the effects of the institutional variables responsible for 
the existence of underinvestment, though some empirical tests partially support the hypothesis 
of undercapitalization. The main institutional variables are identified as being property rights, 
but also the governance of the organization. Other variables, such as the tax system, may have 
distorting effects on the basic institutional mechanisms. 
This paper states the problem of underinvestment in LMFs as it was initially formulated 
by Furubotn and Pejovich and by Vanek in 1970. Starting from explanation of the reasons for 
the  suspicion  that  capital  funds  are  misallocated  in  LMFs,  it  surveys  some  noteworthy 
empirical  tests  and  then  focuses  on  institutional  factors  responsible  for  the  problem  of 
undercapitalization, and on possible solutions.  
The focus is on the basic mechanisms regulating the introduction of divisible reserves. 
This institutional device is considered to be a solution to the  problem of the truncated temporal 
horizon, since members would recoup individually invested quotas of capita at some point in 
time. The introduction of divisible reserves also has important positive potential because it 
engenders higher worker involvement at the financial level. In the version of divisible reserves 
advocated by the paper, labor remuneration would be increased by shares of the net residuals, 
and workers would receive a larger part of the value added of the firm. However, divisible 
reserves  have  critical  aspects  that  need  to  be  considered  carefully.  They  concern  the 
                                                 
1 Meade (1972, p. 402) defines labor-managed firms as follows: “… a system in which workers get together and 
form collectives or partnerships to run firms; they hire capital and purchase other inputs and they sell the products 
of the firm at the best prices they can obtain in the market for inputs and outputs; they themselves bear the risk of 
any unexpected gain or loss and distribute the resulting surplus among themselves, all workers of any one given 
grade or skill receiving an equal share of the surplus; their basic objective is assumed to be to maximize the return 
per worker… the workers may be hiring their capital resources either in a competitive capital market fed by 
private earnings or else from a central governmental organization which lends out the State’s capital resources at 
rentals which will clear the market”.    
          
mechanisms for distribution of the net residuals, the capitalization on individual shares of net 
residuals,  and  the  mechanisms  regulating  the  reimbursement  of  individual  capital  quotas. 
Various asymmetries between labor-managed firms and capitalistic firms will be highlighted in 
order to show the distinctive nature of the distribution of value added and the accumulation of 
capital in LMFs.   
Cooperative bonds, in the version of them presented in this paper, constitute a further 
device with which to improve a firm’s ability to manage the self-financed accumulation of 
capital and the reimbursement of individual capital quotas invested in the firm. If quitting 
members have the right to sell their quotas on regulated markets, the firm will no longer be 
forced  to  pay  back  short  after  the  members’  departure.  A  first  risk  connected  with  the 
introduction of saleable bonds is the transformation of a conspicuous part of the firm’s capital 
into debt held by external financiers. A second risk is the strategic behavior of better-informed 
members, who may leave the organization when negative economic prospects are forthcoming. 
In order to curb the risks deriving from the separation between ownership and control, and 
from strategic quitting, various conditions for the firm’s financial stability are likely to be 
needed. 
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  highlights  the  roots  of  the 
phenomenon of underinvestment and undercapitalization in worker cooperatives.
2 Section 3 
introduces  the  question  of  how  divisible  reserves  should  be  structured  starting  from  their 
institutional underpinnings. Section 4 endeavors to furnish a more precise institutional proposal 
concerning the introduction of bonds in LMFs. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Members’ temporal horizon in labor-managed firms 
Since the studies by Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) and Vanek (1970, 1975), the literature 
on LMFs has devoted considerable attention to the problem of capital accumulation. The focus 
has been on the existence of a truncated temporal horizon for worker-members in LMFs as a 
source of the inefficient allocation of self-financed investment funds. 
                                                 
2  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  the  terms  (worker)  cooperative  and  LMF  (labor-managed  firm)  will  be  used 
interchangeably, although the former term is more commonly found in the empirical literature, whilst the latter is 
more widespread in the theoretical literature.    
          
Furubotn and Pejovich (1970)
3 consider a model of LMF that can be termed ‘socialist’ 
(Horvat, 1984) in that capital assets are assumed? to be publicly owned, i.e. worker members 
are not allowed privately to appropriate the net residuals reinvested in the firm, although the 
firm  manages  their  utilization.  Members  can  only  benefit  from  distributed  returns  on 
investments taking the form of labor income. Hence, the system is defined as a kind of usufruct 
of  socially  owned  capital  assets,  and  is  considered  to  accumulate  self-financed  capital  by 
means of indivisible reserves. Firms are financed by two main means: bank loans, and self-
finance through reinvested net residuals. 
Worker-members  of  cooperatives  receive  an  ordinary  income  (wage)  from  the firm’s 
proceeds, and can use their savings to make two kinds of investment decision. The first is an 
investment  in  non-owned  assets  consisting  of  the  cooperative’s  profits.  The  second  is  an 
investment in owned assets which workers can finance out of distributed labor income (wages) 
and save on individual bank accounts. The former type of investment is not redeemable and 
does not yield an individual return to members, while the second can be recouped and yields 
fixed returns. Hence, workers are induced to compare the returns on the two types of asset at 
the margin. 
Assuming that all workers have the same preferences concerning investment projects and 
that they all expect to remain in the firm for the same amount of time, the following formula 
can be used to calculate the returns on each type of investment necessary to make workers 















                                                                                 (1) 
 
                                                 
3 As is well known, the two authors referred to the former Yugoslav  system. See  also Pejovich (1990) and 
Furubotn (1976, 1978, 1980a, 1980b). Among other papers that address the problem of under-capitalization in 
LMFs from a theoretical point of view, those by by Zafiris (1982) and Bonin (1985) are worth mentioning. The 
book by Jossa and Cuomo (1997) and Jossa (1999) is a good survey of the literature and gives a comprehensive 
and detailed exposition of the theoretical aspects, as does Dow (2003), who advocates the introduction of a market 
for membership rights.    
          
where  LMF PV   is  the  present  value  of  the  self-financed  investment  owned  by  the 
cooperative,  LMF a  is the return yield by the investment in one period of time: this represents the 
rate of indifference between investments in owned and non-owned assets  LMF a  (the hurdle 
rate), since when it is too low and  LMF PV  is lower than 1, workers will prefer investments in 
owned  assets.  T
4  is  the  members’  temporal  horizon,  which  is  identified  with  the  temporal 
horizon  of  the  median  members  when preferences  are  heterogeneous,  i  is  the  rate  of time 
preference which equals the interest rate paid by bank deposits at equilibrium. In the case of a 1 
dollar  investment,  a  is  equal  to  the  internal  rate  of  return  gross  of  depreciation.  If  the 
investment  is  to  be  undertaken,  its  present  value  needs  to  equal  its  initial  value  (1  in  our 
example). 
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Formula (2) shows that  LMF a  is always greater than i and approaches i as the members' 
temporal horizon increases and tends to infinity (which obviously cannot be the case). LMFs 
instead  tend  to  select  only  the  projects  with  the  highest  returns  down  to  the  hurdle  rate. 
Investments  in  productive  assets  are  positive,  but  the  system  allocates  investment  funds 
inefficiently because Pareto-superior allocations are still available. In this respect LMFs are 
Pareto-dominated by capital-managed firms (CMFs below) because share ownership in CMFs 
guarantees  the  acquisition  of  returns  arising  out  of  self-financed  investments  virtually  ad 
infinitum,  i.e.  without  any  temporal  horizon  throughout  the  duration  of  the  firm  itself.  At 
equilibrium, CMFs select all the investment projects which yield a return superior or equal 
                                                 
4 T is an intrinsically uncertain variable. It can be considered dependent on individual preferences and the external 
economic  environment.  For  example,  the  alternative  job  opportunities  available  to  worker-members  tend  to 
shorten  T,  and  this  is  likely  to  increase  time  horizon  problems  for  LMFs  working  in  a  dynamic  economic 
environment. It may explain why LMFs are particularly rare in systems characterized by tough competition and 
strong labor marker flexibility, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, investments 
in human capital specific to a certain firm will tend to extend T since workers that have accumulated firm-specific 
human capital will have difficulties in finding comparable job opportunities in other firms and their competencies 
will gain in economic value for the firm itself.     
          
(where equality is obtained for the marginal investment) to the market interest rate. CMFs 
extract all the possible rents accruing to the firm's operation and have an incentive to do so by 
using  their  own  funds. Total  returns  on  productive assets  in  LMFs  will  be lower  than  the 
socially optimal returns obtainable by CMFs.  
The limited convenience to LMFs of reinvesting their profits may be balanced by access 
to external financial support in the form of bank loans. However, the comparative disadvantage 
with respect to CMFs can never be eliminated because limited self-financing implies a reduced 
capacity to build equity and collateral (Vanek, 1970). LMFs will suffer two disadvantages: the 
first due to their unwillingness to reinvest their net revenues in the firm; the second due to their 
limited ability to guarantee loans. 
Although  some  authors  (Horvat,  1986a,  1986b)  have  preferred  not  to  recognize  the 
significance of the horizon problem in LMFs, most of the literature insists on its importance, 
and other authors, for example Furubotn and Pejovih (1970) and Milanovich (1983), consider 
the horizon problem to be fatal. They seek to demonstrate that LMFs reach a Pareto optimal 
allocation only in exceptional cases, whilst inefficient allocation is the rule. The exceptionality 
of efficient solutions coupled with the uncertainty characteristic of investment decisions in 
market settings and the permanence of worker members in LMFs is one of the main reasons 
why worker cooperatives are rare in market economies.
5 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence 
The  empirical  evidence  is  quite  supportive  of,  but  not  fully  consistent  with,  these 
theoretical conclusions. Horvat (1986a) and Milanovic (1983) found  that Yugoslav firms had a 
pronounced propensity to increase their debt with respect to owned resources  However, in the 
case of Yugoslavia, reinvestment of positive results was mandatory, and any reduction in the 
capital stock was forbidden. These factors may explain why loan financing was preferred in 
many  circumstances.  To  our  knowledge,  the  best  empirical  tests  of  the  hypothesis  of 
                                                 
5 While some authors have tried to show that the problem is not as severe as it appears to be in the basic model 
(Stephen, 1980; Zafiris, 1982; Bonin, 1985; Horvat, 1986a, 1986b; Jossa and Cuomo, 1997, 2000; Jossa, 1999), 
others have attempted to devise alternative financial instruments (McCain, 1977; Vanek, 1977; Conte, Smith and 
Ye, 1992; Smith and Waldmann, 1999; Mazzoli and Negrini, 2000; Albanese, 2003) or institutional arrangements    
          
undercapitalization have been performed in Western countries. Berman and Berman’s (1989) 
study on plywood cooperatives in the US Pacific Northwest, characterized by the presence of a 
market for membership rights,
6 compared them to similar capitalist firms in the same sector 
and geographic region. The authors estimated a production function on the basis of balance 
sheet data and tested all the main implications of the standard version of the Ward model 
(1958). Cooperatives operated at constant returns to scale, since production took place at the 
point of minimum average costs. Hence they fully exploited their capital stock while capitalist 
firms may have been inefficiently overcapitalized. This tendency may have been due to a better 
ability  to  exploit  lower  capital  intensity  and  to  the  use  of  labor  intensive  technologies. 
However, a higher marginal product of capital and a lower marginal product of labor, at least in 
the  short  run,  was  found.  This  evidence  was  coupled  with  a  lower  capital/labor  ratio  in 
cooperatives. These results support the idea that cooperatives tend to invest less than capitalist 
firms,  though  no  capital  starvation  (fall  of  the  capital  stock  to  zero)  was  detected,  and 
cooperatives were able to increase their size and capital stock over time. These findings are 
quite striking if the presence of transferable shares is taken into account, and they may indicate 
pronounced imperfections in the market for membership rights that prevent cooperatives from 
recouping their disadvantage with respect to capitalist firms at the financial level. 
Bartlett et al. (1992) examined a matched sample of Italian industrial firms, coupling 
cooperatives  with  capitalist  firms  of  similar  characteristics.  The  Italian  environment  is 
characterized by the absence of a market for membership shares, which is forbidden by law. 
Until the time of the study, Italian cooperatives had accumulated capital almost exclusively by 
means of indivisible reserves, plus bank loans, even if members held individual capital quotas 
of limited amount and loans supplied by cooperative members were allowed. Bartlett et al. 
found a significantly lower ratio of fixed assets per head in cooperatives, indicating the use of 
more labor-intensive production processes. Lower capital intensity was off-set by significantly 
higher  labor  productivity  favored  by  a lower  incidence  of  managerial  workers,  strikes  and 
worker turnover. In addition, the depreciation rate of fixed assets was lower in capitalist firms 
and  may  have  signalled  a  shorter  time  horizon  for  the  turnover  of  capital  equipment  in 
cooperatives,  since  depreciation  costs  were  higher.  Cooperatives  showed  a  similar,  though 
                                                                                                                                                            
(Vanek, 1975, 1996; Bernan and Bernan, 1978; Meade, 1980, 1995; Dow, 1986, 1993, 1996) which could be 
viable solutions for the horizon problem.    
          
slightly lower, ratio of internal funds to total capital (about 50%) to capitalist firms. However, 
once internal member loans had been accounted for, the ratio of debt per head was significantly 
higher  in  cooperatives.  Moreover,  the  Italian  tax  system  for  cooperatives,  which  strongly 
favored the accumulation of capital by means of indivisible reserves, may have played a role in 
sustaining  the  accumulation  of  internal  funds.  Once  again,  although  strong  evidence  of 
undercapitalization was not found, and cooperatives had been able to grow despite the absence 
of tradable shares, differences with respect to capitalist firms were systematic. 
The results of these studies may support the contention that worker cooperatives are able 
to compete with capitalist firms only in sectors characterized by relatively low capital intensity, 
where financial shortcomings can be compensated by cooperatives’ advantages, for example 
higher  labor  productivity.  However,  such  compensation  is  limited,  and  when  the  financial 
disadvantage is too pronounced cooperatives may be forced out of the market or transformed 
into capitalist firms. In Italy, for example, many cooperatives have been compelled in recent 
years  to  introduce  financial  instruments  drawn  from  the  capitalist  environment in  order  to 
withstand  competition  by  international  companies,  or  to  enter  capital  intensive  sectors 
(Mazzoli, 2005). 
Further  empirical  evidence  shows  that  cooperatives  usually  self-select  themselves  in 
labor intensive sectors (Ben-Ner,1988). However, the same results have not be obtained for the 
Mondragon  cooperatives  (Thomas  and  Logan,  1982),  which  do  not  show  signs  of 
undercapitalization with respect to capitalist firms of similar size. This finding is crucial for the 
development  of  our  argument,  since  the  Mondragon  cooperatives  are  characterized  by  the 
presence  of  (partly)  divisible  reserves  of  capital,  which  greatly  increase  their  members’ 
financial involvement, though no tradable shares for membership positions are allowed.    
Finally,  some  factors  that  may  limit  the  robustness  of  empirical  tests  should  be 
highlighted. For example, the tax system may cause distortions. If current labor income is 
taxed, but reinvested profits are not, the optimal choice of investments will shift in favor of 
future consumption, and the Furubotn - Pejovich effect may be hidden even when it is present 
(Horvat,  1986a,  pp.  25-26).  If  the  central  authorities  control  the  credit  market  and 
administratively fix the interest rate on loans below the free market rate, firms will tend to 
                                                                                                                                                            
6Shares representing the value of the membership position in the firm can be sold on the market for membership 
rights by quitting members to incoming members. The market value of the shares is thought to mirror the present    
          
overuse the credit market, all the more so in the presence of limited liability and soft budget 
constraints (Kornai, 1986, Buck and Wright, 1990). In these cases, LMFs may even turn out to 
be over-capitalized.   
 
3. Divisible reserves in labor managed firms 
Divisible  reserves,  i.e.  a  system  of  individual  capital  quotas  appropriable  by  worker 
members at some future point in time, are a viable solution to the problem of unrecoverability 
of capital quotas, and they do not suffer from the Furubotn-Pejovich effect because invested 
funds  are  recouped  by members.  In  order  to  achieve  equivalence  between  the present  and 
future  ownership  of  invested  funds,  it  is  sufficient  to  remunerate  them  at the  rate  of  time 
preference between present and future consumption. This seems to be one of the most effective 
mechanisms with which to counter the risk of undercapitalization.  
The following exploration of the problems linked to the introduction of divisible reserves 
starts from the background institutions that support and influence the accumulation of capital in 
LMFs,  primarily  property  rights.  Some  shortcomings  of  the  proposal  are  examined,  and 
possible solutions are suggested. 
Hansmann  (1988,  p.  269;  1996)
7  defines  the  ownership  of  a  firm  as the coupling  of 
residual rights of control and the right to appropriate the net residual.
8 The former refers to the 
owners’  authority  in  all events  not  explicitly  covered  by the contracts  signed  by  the  firm, 
especially  labor  contracts.  In  the  presence  of  incomplete  contracts,  an  uncertain  economic 
environment and non-standardized tasks, residual rights of control will grant some degree of 
discretionary power in management of the firm. The latter is a consequence of the former 
(Putterman,  1988,  Dow  2003)
9:  if  the  firm’s  owners  are  to  control  all  non-contracted 
operations, they will also decide on the destination of the residual, which is non-contracted by 
                                                                                                                                                            
value of future returns on the membership position. 
7 I take Hansmann’s definition to represent the property rights school, which, as is well-known, was initiated by 
other authors (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990, 1996)  
8 The residual is what if left at the end of the period, and corresponds to the profit in CMFs. Meade (1980, pp. 89-
93) distinguishes between "residual" and "net residual".  The residual is equal to total net labor earnings, the 
value added of the firm less the cost of capital. Net residual is the value added less the cost of capital less current 
labor income (a variable that roughly corresponds to wages in CMFs). 
9 For detailed and interesting discussion of the interplay and possible causal links between residual rights of 
control and residual rights of appropriation see Dow (2003).    
          
definition. As a consequence, in the general case the two rights are bundled together.
10 If we 
compare  Hansmann's  definition  of  the  ownership  of  the  firm  with  the  system  of  usufruct 
analyzed in section 2, we note that it does not entail the collective ownership of the means of 
production. It consequently does not exclude the individual appropriation of the end-of-period 
net residuals.  
Application  of  Hansmann’s  definition  to  labor-managed  firms  yields  important 
implications. In LMFs members enjoy residual rights of control. The residual has the economic 
nature of labor remuneration since labor as a production factor is entitled to decide about its 
destination. The members’ right to appropriate the residual also implies that the remuneration 
of capital is contracted ex ante. The reason is that there cannot be two residuals in a single 
production  organization,  and  if  the  unique  residual  is  appropriated  by  labor,  it  cannot  be 
appropriated  by  capital  (Jossa  and  Cuomo,  1997).  Capital  remuneration may  be  above the 
market interest rate because of the higher financial risk undergone by individual capital quotas 
as compared to standard loans. Yet it is still contracted and, as a rule, fixed. 
Appropriation by worker members of the net residual generates a search for workable 
reinvestment mechanisms compatible with LMF property rights. In the presence of divisible 
reserves, the net residual will have to be shared among members according to some kind of 
rule. Because the net residual has the nature of labor income, it must be distributed as an 
extension  of  the  current  labor  income  already  paid  during  the  accounting  period.  At  the 
empirical level, the tradition of cooperative movements comprises a number of institutions that 
act in this manner. In Italy, for example, cooperatives can distribute part of the net residual to 
members in this way (under the heading ristorni, which have recently been reevaluated by 
legislation
11). The same rule is followed by the Mondragon cooperatives. 
The end-of-year extensions of current labor income constitute additional remuneration 
for workers which is not paid to employees in capitalistic firms. Workers’ incomes will include 
a current part, similar to the wages paid by capitalist firms, and a residual part which is more 
                                                 
10 In Hansmann’s words (1988): “In theory, the right to control and to residual earnings could be held by different 
persons. In practice, however, they are generally joined, since those with control would otherwise have little 
incentive to use their control to maximize the residual earnings. To be sure, if all aspects of control could be 
contracted for ex-ante, then this problem would not arise. But control can usually be thought of as authority over 
precisely those aspects of firm policy that, because of high transaction costs or bounded rationality, cannot be 
specified ex-ante in a contract, but rather must be left to the discretion of those to whom the authority is granted”. 
11 By law no. 42, 2001, and law no. 366, 2001.    
          
similar to dividends paid out to shareholders in CMFs. End-of-year residuals serve various 
purposes: first, they are commonly used to self-finance risky investment projects; second, they 
constitute the collateral needed to obtain credit from financial institutions; third, they buffer 
workers  against  short-term  fluctuations  in  the  firm’s  revenues,  thus  limiting  excessive 
fluctuations in current labor income; fourth, they are liable to absorb negative economic results 
such as losses; finally, they can be paid out in cash and represent additional current income. 
Hence, in many cases, workers do not appropriate the net residual in cash but must reinvest 
their  share  in  order  to  finance  investments,  as  happens  in  capitalist  companies.  When 
individual shares of net residuals are reinvested, divisible reserves of capital are created.
12 
Individual shares of net residuals, when used to self-finance a firm, can be equated to a 
form of equity capital since they perform the same functions as the latter. However, differences 
with respect to equity in capitalist firms should be borne in mind: first, they are remunerated by 
a fixed interest rate, while equity capital in CMFs receives the full residual (profit); second, 
they can be recoverable, and their circulation on the market in the form of equity shares may 
not be allowed because their accumulation is linked to the worker’s personal position as a 
member of the cooperative.
13  
 
3.1. The compulsory capitalization of individual quotas and the danger of free riding 
The use of shares of residual labor income as part of equity in LMFs may encounter an 
obstacle in the form of free riding. If the decision on what part of the individual quotas of the 
net residual is to be reinvested in the firm is left entirely to individual members, free riding is 
likely to ensue. The collective of members as a whole has an interest in investing the optimal 
amount of money because it will receive the maximum benefit from doing so, and it will be 
able  to  maximize  the  collective  wealth.  However,  each  individual  member  may  prefer  to 
withdraw his/her individual quota and put it to other uses. Withdrawing members will gain the 
                                                 
12  Of  course,  ex  ante  decisions  may  influence  the  partition  between  current  labor  remuneration and  the  net-
residual,  thus  conditioning  investment  decisions.  If  a  lower  level  of  investments  is  required,  members  may 
confidently pay out a higher level of current remuneration during the accounting period. However, the issue of the 
endogenous partition between current remuneration and and-of-the-year residuals will not be explicitly dealt with 
here, because the principal concern is to devise solutions suitable for the destination of the net residual, while the 
destination of current quotas of labor income is at the full disposal of members.    
          
returns on investments made by their fellow workers in the form of labor income since, as a 
rule, labor remuneration in LMFs is distributed on the basis of collective decisions or rules 
valid for the entire membership. In big firms, the withdrawal of each individual quota may do 
little harm to the firm’s patrimonial solidity since it may only reduce investments by a tiny 
fraction.  However,  the  spread  of  this  kind  of  behavior  would  cripple  the  firm’s  growth 
potential. If free-riding is the danger, it must be kept at bay, and the best way to do so is by 
imposing a collective obligation to abide by decisions on the reinvestment of residuals.
14 
This statement is supported by a wide array of experimental results in the field of public 
goods finance (Fehr and  Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2000), but also by the neoclassical 
theory of public goods and club goods (Cornes and Sandler, 1986). If there is no constraint on 
individual behavior, the financing of public goods leads to severe free-riding phenomena which 
render the pursuit of production impossible. The imposition of mandatory contributions and of 
a system of punishments (fines) for deviant behavior produces completely different results. 
Since  deviance  is  punished,  everybody  is  able  to  trust  the  commitment  to  financing  the 
endeavor,  making  accumulation  possible.  In  our  case,  if  reinvestment  (partial  or  total)  is 
mandatory for the entire membership, fines for deviant behavior are not necessary, because 
funds are directly reinvested by the firm,
15 different individual preferences notwithstanding.  
At  the  empirical  level,  constitutional  rules  in  Mondragon  cooperatives  impose 
compulsory capitalization of all positive residuals. Hence they do not leave the decision on the 
percentage of the net residual to be reinvested in each accounting period, or paid out in cash, to 
the discretion of their members. Indeed, the main founding values of the Mondragon group are 
growth and the creation of new employment, and these justify the prescription. In a general 
framework applying to an entire economy, it may be wiser to include both solutions in the 
firm’s statutes.  
 
3.2. The reimbursement of individual capital quotas 
                                                                                                                                                            
13 Because it is a type of equity capital, the accumulation of net residuals may enable LMFs to avoid the problems 
linked to the dilemma of the collateral (Vanek, 1970), the law of increasing risk (McCain, 1977), and the lack of 
equity (Gui, 1985). 
14 Collective reinvestment of all net residuals is mandatory in the Mondragon cooperatives. 
15 For more comprehensive treatment see Tortia (2003).    
          
A  second  fundamental  asymmetry  between  capital  quotas  in  capitalistic  and  labor 
managed firms arises because, in LMFs, worker-members must necessarily quit the firm at 
some point in time. Accumulation of equity capital is strictly linked to members’ positions 
because it is the result of reinvestment of labor income residuals. When a member quits the 
organization,  s/he  is  not  entitled  to  any  form  of  labor  remuneration.  Furthermore,  quitting 
members lose their share of control over the firm. Control and risk-bearing are necessarily 
linked because lack of control implies that it is impossible to shield against the economic risk 
implied by the presence of equity capital. Consequently, quitting members are not in a position 
to accumulate new equity capital and to exert control over the use of the quotas accumulated in 
the past. These problems are absent in CMFs because, in their case, capital quotas are not 
linked to the positions of individual members, and they can be sold at a price mirroring the 
present value of future returns on the firm’s investments.  
The most common solution to the problem of a lack of control over equity capital by 
quitting  members  is  the  mandatory  reimbursement  of  individual  capital  quotas,  which 
engenders the well-known phenomenon of capital variability cooperative firms. This is the 
solution adopted, for example, by the Italian, French and Spanish legislations.
16 Equity capital 
variability may be a serious financial obstacle for cooperatives, which in this regard are usually 
considered  to  be  at  a  disadvantage  with  respect  to  capitalistic  firms  (Dow,  2003).  The 
compulsoriness of reimbursement may weaken the financial structure of the firm if numerous 
owners of important shares of capital quit the firm over a short period of time. Moreover, 
capital variability reduces the firm’s ability to offer collateral to financial institutions, which 
will take a more conservative position when deciding whether to finance it.
17   
                                                 
16 For example, individual capital quotas are termed capitale sociale in the Italian cooperative tradition. They are 
reimbursed to quitting members within six months from approval of the budget following the member’s departure. 
The Italian cooperative law defines cooperatives as “variable capital companies” as opposed to capitalistic firms 
(società di capitali), which are “fixed capital companies”. 
17  The  main  alternative  to  the  reimbursement  of  individual  capital  quotas  is  the  creation  of  a  market  for 
membership rights (Dow, 2003) where quitting workers can sell their positions as members of the cooperative to 
incoming members. Dow (1986, 1993, 1996) shows that, at equilibrium, the market for membership rights would 
have the same efficiency features as markets for shares in capitalist economies. However, empirical evidence, for 
example  concerning  the  plywood  cooperatives  in  the  USA  Pacific  North-West,  shows  various  market 
imperfections which render its implementation problematic. The main shortcoming is the difficulty of finding 
suitable new members willing and able to buy the membership position. The new membermust be accepted by 
incumbent  members  and,  at  the  same  time,  wealthy  enough  to  afford  the  price  of  the  position.  Prices  for 
membership positions may be extremely high in capital intensive sectors. Furthermore, asymmetric information is 
likely to play a crucial role in limiting the effectiveness of the market for membership rights. If the investment is 
partially  sunk,  a  lock-in  phenomenon  can  be  envisaged  whereby  incoming  members  are  subject  to  morally 
hazardous behavior by the rest of the membership. Finally, when the value of the membership position is difficult    
          
When an important part of the firm’s capital is accumulated in the form of divisible 
reserves to be reimbursed to members, financial instability may in the most extreme cases 
cause financial distress. Issues concerning asymmetric information and moral hazard must be 
taken into account as well. If members have access to privileged information on the economic 
and financial position of the firm, they may decide to quit strategically in order to have their 
quotas reimbursed before other liabilities come to the point of restitution [?], thus aggravating 
the crisis. The prediction of this kind of event induces many cooperatives not to accumulate 
divisible  reserves  and  to  resort  to  indivisible  reserves,  which  cannot  be  appropriated  by 
members at any point in time. This is the case, for example, of Italian cooperatives, where the 
shares  of  the  net  residual  attributed  to  members  is,  in  most  cases,  tiny  or  nil.  Capital 
accumulation  by  means  of  indivisible  reserves  has  the  advantage  of  stabilizing  the  firm’s 
equity  capital.  Because  it  is  not  appropriable,  it  is  fixed  and  can  both  finance  investment 
projects  and  serve  as  collateral.  However,  as  stressed  in  Section  2,  it  impedes  individual 
financial involvement and may trigger undercapitalization.
18   
Various solutions have been proposed for this problem.
19 Tortia (2002) and Zevi (2003, 
2005) consider various possibilities. The first step is the transformation of individual capital 
quotas into debt to be repaid by the firm to quitting members. The problem of the lack of 
control  by  quitting  members  over  risky  quotas  of  capital  is  thus  solved.  Furthermore,  the 
repayment of debt held by quitting members can be made conditional on? the repayment of 
standard loans held by third parties (Cuomo, 2003). This arrangement is necessary because it 
limits the danger of diluting the right of third parties to have their credits repaid before equity. 
As for the terms of reimbursement, the main solutions proposed are the following:  
                                                                                                                                                            
to evaluate by newcomers, the actual price paid may be significantly less than its market value. Indeed, most 
plywood cooperatives in the USA have been sold to capitalist companies after being active companies for roughly 
half a century. 
18 This is not the case of divisible reserves. If we return to formula (2) in section two and use the same 
symbols, we can see that divisible reserves evade the problem of the temporal horizon. Since they need to be 
reimbursed at some point in time, they can be likened to loans. If  we consider the present value of 1 Euro 
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we find that the sum is equal to 1 whatever the values of T and i. In fact (3) is an identity, not a equilibrium 
condition. The present value of one Euro deposited in a bank account, yielding an interest of i  for T periods of 
time and withdrawn at time T is 1.  
19 No solution is to be found in the financial structure of CMFs, since, as already stated, in their case the problem 
of the temporal horizon does not exist.    
          
  Extended terms for reimbursement. Suitable longer terms for reimbursement may be 
devised to reduce financial pressures on firms and lessen the risks of members’ moral 
hazard: if there is a long time span between quittance and reimbursement the possibility 
of strategic behavior can be limited.  
  Sale of the credit to financial institutions. Quitting members could sell their credit to 
financial institutions. This would be a step toward reconciling the firm’s and members’ 
interests. Members could increase their liquidity and firms would have longer terms for 
repayment. 
  Transformation of credits into bonds saleable on regulated financial markets. Credits 
held by quitting members could be allowed to circulate on financial markets in the form 
of bonds. The market would fix the price of the title and, again, members would be able 
to increase their liquidity. Banks and other ad hoc financial institutions could be given 
the task of buying individual shares and circulating them on the market.   
These solutions need to be discussed further.
20 The next section outlines a more specific 
institutional proposal concerning the introduction of LMF bonds. 
 
4. The structuring of new institutional solutions: LMF bonds 
The previous section concentrated on the possible problems arising from the introduction 
of divisible reserves in LMFs. This section will focus on institutional mechanisms with which 
to address the problems concerning capital variability and the reimbursement of individual 
capital quotas.  
The  role  of  indivisible  reserves  must  be  examined  before  the  structure  of  divisible 
reserves and the introduction of cooperative bonds are discussed. Indivisible reserves are a 
crucial component of LMFs’ capital structure, and they will continue to be so in the future, 
even if their role will become less all-embracing, and more room for individual quotas will be 
required. Indivisible reserves are the collective element in the financial structure of a firm, and 
                                                 
20 Experimental economics could play an important role in offering general suggestions, for example about the 
parameters adopted to regulate the firm’s financial stability in the presence of divisible reserves, before in-field 
experimentation starts.    
          
they are not subject to the frictions due to the heterogeneity of individual preferences and 
strategic behavior linked to capital variability. They may cushion individual members against 
individual  losses  and  represent  the  financial  resource  of  last  resort  needed  in  periods  of 
economic crisis so that the firm can survive when individual members are unable to support it. 
All  the  other  components  of  a  LMF’s  capital  structure  can  undergo  changes  more  or  less 
dangerous  to  its  financial  stability.  A  minimum  level  of  indivisible  reserves  is  therefore 
necessary.  In  order  to  dampen  the  Furubotn-Pejovich  effect,  and  so  as  not  to  reduce  the 
members’ financial involvement excessively, their amount is likely to need an upper bound? as 
well. 
When  part  of  the  net  residual  is  distributed  individually  and  reinvested  in  the  firm, 
divisible reserves of capital are created. In this case, given the above considerations, all the 
members contribute their individual shares, which are additional parts of labor remuneration.  
 
4.1. Reimbursement of individual quotas and LMF bonds 
As a rule, individual quotas accumulated cannot be reimbursed while the worker is a 
member of the enterprise. This is a norm necessary in order not to reduce members’ financial 
involvement and not to reduce the firm’s capital. When the member quits the organization, the 
controlling body may decide to reimburse his/her quota immediately (for example when the 
value of the quota is negligible) but it may also decide to retain the quota within the firm. If the 
member is not allowed to sell his/her quota, a reimbursement schedule must be established. It 
is  possible  to  imagine  the  creation  of  independent  bodies  assessing  (on  request  by  the 
interested parties) the suitable duration of the reimbursement period given the share of the 
overall capital of the firm held by the member, and the firm’s general financial conditions. The 
law may impose an upper and a lower time bound? on reimbursement schedules.   
If individual quotas can be sold on a market for LMF bonds, the reimbursement period 
can  become  much  longer  and  favor  the  undertaking  of  long-run  investment  projects.  It  is 
possible to imagine the pay-back process lasting from 10 to 30 years or more, but it is also 
possible to envisage irredeemable bonds. Members will then be able to choose between the sale 
and the retention of their quota. In the latter case, when their quotas are redeemable, they will 
have  to  wait  for  the  fixed  schedule  term  before  they  are  reimbursed.  When  quotas  are    
          
irredeemable, members may either retain them and sell them at a future moment in time, or 
wait for the firm’s liquidation.      
The introduction of saleable bonds has the potential to spur individual effort, because 
members who quit firms in better economic and financial circumstances will be able to sell 
their quotas at higher prices (Zevi, 2003, 2005). Individual quotas will be likely to be sold at a 
discount whose amount will mirror the firm’s financial conditions and default probabilities. 
The presence of saleable bonds will also reduce the risk of members quitting the organization 
for strategic reasons. Quitting members know that weakening the firm’s financial structure will 
increase the risks of default, hence reducing the market value of their quotas. An endogenous 
incentive  will  be  created  whereby  members  will  tend  to  leave  the  organization  only  upon 
retirement or because of other unavoidable necessities.    
If worker-members are entitled to have their individual quotas reimbursed, or to sell them 
when they quit the organization, a rule determining the minimum amount of equity held by 
incumbent members is required. The reason for this is that if the bulk of the firm’s capital is 
held by quitted workers (ex-members) or sold on the market, a dangerous separation between 
ownership (of the firm capital) and control (of the organization) will arise. The protection of 
the firm’s creditors (e.g. banks) and its members’ financial involvement would be too weak. 
Members may choose excessively risky investments if their financial stake is too small. The 
cost  of the  debt  offered  by  financial  institutions  would increase, and  rationing might arise 
because the firm would no longer be able to offer adequate collateral. Risks of default would 
increase and the price of saleable quotas would fall. The law of increasing risk (MacCain, 
1977) would once again operate.  
Since this kind of perverse dynamic may be triggered  members quitting strategically and 
selling their quotas on the market before their price falls, it may be necessary to impose a 
restrictive  rule:  individual  quotas  may  not  be  sold  if  the  percentage  of  capital  held  by 
incumbents falls below a minimum threshold. Buyers of LMF bonds and other creditors would 
be  protected  against  members’  morally  hazardous  behavior  if  the  quotas  held  by  quitted 
members are reimbursed after liabilities toward third parties have been fulfilled?. 
Loss  sharing  is  a  further  problem  to  be  solved  if  the  firm  is  to  retain  its  financial 
equilibrium. Losses can be covered by indivisible reserves, but only under certain conditions:    
          
the  level  of  indivisible  reserves  must  be  high  enough  to  comply  with  legal  requirements. 
Cumulated indivisible reserves will no longer absorb losses when their level falls below some 
minimum threshold. If indivisible reserves are above the minimal threshold fixed by law, then 
members may have the right to impute losses to the common part of capital. When losses are 
not absorbed by indivisible reserves, the individual quotas held by incumbent members must 
be reduced.  
When individual quotas are reduced, it is possible also to consider the possibility of 
reducing the value of titles held by terminated members and by bond owners. For example, 
with a 3-Euros reduction in quotas held by incumbent members, the value of titles held by 
quitting members may be reduced by 2 Euros, and the value of bonds held by third parties by 
one Euro. This mechanism would entail: 
•  The redistribution of losses among all capital owners, without giving incumbent 
members an incentive to undertake excessively risky investment projects (they 
would still bear the worst consequences of negative economic results); 
•  The increased riskiness of cooperative bonds. The higher risk is likely to reduce 
the market value of the titles. However, the risks incurred by members during 
their work experience would be reduced; 
•  The incentive to quit the firm in the presence of difficult economic conditions 
would be reduced, because members would know that they are not the only party 
suffering  financial  losses  in  the  case  of  negative  performance,  and  that  they 
would incur losses even if they quit the firm. 
The  mechanisms  described  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  would  generate  two  new 
categories of stakeholders: terminated members (classified between retired and non-retired) 
and LMF bond owners. Given that they may undergo financial losses in the event of negative 
economic results, their stake in the firm is risky, and suitable participatory arrangements should 
be made for their inclusion in management of the firm’s finances. Control over the firm is still 
exercised  by  incumbent  members  because  they  are  responsible  for  its  activity  and  its 
consequences  on  their  welfare  in  terms  of  income  and  working  conditions,  and  they  also 
bearing the bulk of the financial risks. Participation by other financial stakeholders may be 
structured on the basis of information and consultation rights. If the firm takes decisions risky    
          
for stakeholders other than incumbent members, the provision of suitable information may 
assist them in deciding on the sale or the retention of their titles.     
 
4.2. Hierarchy of liabilities 
An  important  requirement  that  ensues  from  the  institutional  mechanisms  regulating 
divisible  reserves  is  that  liabilities  must  be  ordered  according  to  their  specific  rights  to 
reimbursement in the event of default or upon liquidation, for two reasons: 
1)  In the absence of a precise order in rights to reimbursement upon default, better 
informed subjects (the incumbents) may exploit their information advantage.  
2)  More closely-involved subjects (again, the incumbents) bear the responsibility 
for strategic choices. They will have to bear the costs of wrong decisions before 
all the other financial stakeholders.     
 Hence, a suitable order of financial instruments must be devised in order to reduce the 
risks for less well-informed financial stakeholders.  
Indivisible  reserves  must  be  treated  separately  from  the  other  financial  instruments 
because they are funds owned by the firm itself, and are not at the disposal of the financial 
stakeholders of the firm. Upon liquidation, a minimum required level of indivisible reserves 
should be protected against appropriation by other stakeholders, while surplus? quotas may be 
used to compensate liabilities. In the absence of this limitation, past reserves accumulated by 
previous generations of workers would be at risk of improper appropriation by newcomers, for 
example in the form of higher salaries or fringe benefits that may increase losses. The residual 
value of indivisible reserves may be transferred to other cooperatives or to common funds used 
to finance new cooperative enterprises? (inter-cooperative mutuality), as happens, for example, 
in Italy. 
Among the financial instruments owned by the stakeholders in the firm, traditional loans 
must enjoy maximum protection and must be the first to be reimbursed. The creditors are 
usually financial institutions able to verify the firm’s ability to repay loans. However, because    
          
they are purely contracted liabilities, without direct links with the firm’s managerial choices, 
they should bear the minimum amount of risk.  
LMF bonds sold on the market come second in the hierarchy of liabilities. They can be 
bought by subjects uninvolved in the firm’s management. However, they are directly linked 
with  the  firm’s  management  because they  derive  from  the  sale  of  titles  held  by  members. 
Moreover, they have always been viewed as risky financial activities which may be only partly 
reimbursed  if  the  firm  is  unable  to  cover  its  losses  with  other  means.  Higher  returns  will 
compensate for higher risks.   
Third,  retired  members  who  decide  not  to  sell  their  quotas  should  enjoy  privileged 
reimbursement with respect to incumbent members. This mechanism would create an incentive 
to  stay  with  the  firm  and  be  loyal,  because  retired  members  enjoy  more  secure  financial 
positions. Furthermore, retired members no longer take strategic decisions within the firm and 
should not bear the consequences of wrong decisions.  
Individual  quotas  held  by  quitted  members  and  quotas  held  by  incumbent  members 
should be the riskiest financial activities, and hence the last to be reimbursed, since they derive 
directly from strategic choices taken within the firms by subjects in possession of the best 
information concerning the firm’s economic results and prospects.  
Quitted members may decide whether to retain their quotas or to sell it. If they decide not 
to sell their quotas, the problem of the reimbursement of their quotas relative to incumbent 
members  arises.  They  have  a  strong  relation  with  the  firm’s  activity  (their  past  work 
experience)  but  have  more  limited  information  than  incumbents  and  do  not  bear 
responsibilities  for  recent  strategic  decisions.  Their  responsibilities  for  negative  economic 
results are more limited than those of incumbents. Hence, preference could be given to their 
positions so that they enjoy privileged reimbursement with respect to incumbent members. 
However, other considerations suggest a different solution. First, loyalty to the firm should be 
rewarded, while premature exits should not be incentivised. Second, if quitted members enjoy 
privileged reimbursement, a strong incentive would be created for them to leave the firm when 
its economic prospects are negative, further weakening the firm’s competitive potential and 
financial strength. If the riskiness of their financial stakes is unchanged when they leave the 
firm,  this incentive  would  by  eliminated.  Of  course  they could  quit  anyway and  sell  their    
          
quotas, cashing them in at the market value and evading future economic risks. However, in 
this case, the market for LMF bonds would play a crucial role in curbing morally hazardous 
behavior. If anomalous exits take place, market exchanges will tend to punish this behavior by 
increasing the discount rate applied to the sale of members’ quotas. The discount rate may 
become so large that it discourages sale altogether. On the other hand, quitting the job may be a 
bad  solution if  firm-specific,  at  least  partly  sunk,  investments  in  human capital  have  been 
made. 
A  final  issue  concerning the  hierarchy of  liabilities  has  to  do  with  the  restitution  of 
individual  capital  quotas.  The  firm  cannot  be  forced  to  repay  capital  quotas  to  individual 
workers while they are members of the firm. However, the majority of members may decide 
collectively to reimburse part of their capital stakes, for example when over-capitalization is 
present or down-sizing is needed. They may be allowed to do so, but only under stringent 
conditions.  First,  restitution  cannot  in  any  circumstance  lead  to  a  reduction  of  indivisible 
reserves. When part of individual capital quotas are paid back the ratio of indivisible reserves 
to total capital increases. If only a minimum level is required for the part of capital to be held 
collectively, then indivisible reserves can be “eaten” by means of this mechanism. This way, 
funds accumulated by previous generations of workers would risk to be dissipated. Second, 
restitution can take place only when the ratio between the total amount of quotas held by 
incumbent members and the total capital of the firm (indivisible reserves plus quotas held by 
members - incumbent, quitted and retired - plus bonds) is higher than the minimum required. 
Third, the ratio of capital to external debt must also be higher than the minimum. When all the 
conditions for financial viability are met, members may be allowed to vote for restitution of the 
surplus.  In  this  case,  incumbent  members
21  may  be  favored  by  being  allowed  to  enjoy 
restitution  before  all  other  classes  of  financial  stakeholder,  for  example  before  quitted 
members. The reason for this is that incumbent members bear all the relevant economic risks, 
and are the least protected in the event of financial difficulties. Moreover, this mechanism 
would  be  a  further  incentive  to  loyalty  because  only  incumbent  members  could  vote  for 
restitution, while quitted and retired members would lose this right. An incumbent member 
would weigh the possibility of leaving the firm and selling his/her quota at a discount against 
the  possibility  of  staying  with  the  firm  and  voting  for  partial  restitution  at  face  value. 
                                                 
21 Also the position of retired members who did not sell their individual quotas may be favored and equated to the 
position of incumbent members.    
          
Restitution of capital quotas is allowed in capitalistic firms, while cooperative legislation often 
precludes this possibility. For example, the Italian legislation on cooperatives forbade it until a 
few years ago. Under new legislation (corporate law, no. 366, 2001) individual members may 
not ask for partial restitution (in order to counter predictable risk of free-riding on individual 
contributions), but it is not forbidden to reduce the total amount of capital held individually by 
the workforce as a whole.  
At any rate, partial restitution of individual quotas is likely to be a rare occurrence, given 
the  requirement  to  respect  stringent  constraints  on  financial  stability.  Heterogeneous 
preferences among members would often preclude this possibility, since young incumbents 
would prefer to retain capital within the firm, even when members about to quit would prefer 
restitution. Furthermore, firm directors would often prefer a higher equity to debt ratio so that 
the firm’s financial strength can be preserved. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The Furubotn-Pejovich effects has been acknowledge by various authors as the main 
obstacle  against  the  efficient  allocation  and  accumulation  of  self-financed  capital  funds  in 
labor-managed firms, when collective ownership of the means of production and indivisible 
reserves of capital are accepted as the institutional standard. The literature on Yugoslav-type 
economic systems is thus able to explain the causes of undercapitalization and self-selection in 
labor-intensive sectors. However, the type of cooperative firm described by the most studies in 
the literature is very specific and based on the usufruct of collectively-owned capital funds. 
Hence,  it  should  not  be  taken as  a  general  pattern, and  improvements  are  possible if  new 
institutional devices prove effective.   
Among the proposals on how to correct the distortions caused by the Furubotn-Pejovich 
effect, the introduction of divisible reserves of capital seems particularly promising. Its main 
positive features are greater worker involvement at the financial level with the corresponding 
addition of shares of value added in labor remuneration, and the elimination of the horizon 
problem. This paper has concentrated on the potential problems arising from the introduction 
of divisible reserves. Different property rights between capitalist and labor-managed firms give 
rise to fundamental asymmetries which are particularly marked as far as the mechanisms of    
          
distribution of the net residuals, the reinvestment and the reimbursement of individual capital 
quotas are concerned. Analysis of the problem shows that it is on these asymmetries that future 
research  will  have  to  focus  if  viable  solutions  to  increase  the  growth  potential  of  worker 
cooperatives are to be found.  
The structuring of new institutional mechanisms is crucial if sustainable processes of 
capital accumulation are to be devised. The final section of the paper has examined the critical 
aspects of the conversion of individual capital quotas into titles saleable on the market for 
cooperative bonds; an arrangement which has the potential to solve the problem of capital 
variability  in  the  presence  of  divisible  reserves.  The  most  evident  doubt  concerns  the 
sustainability of this kind of market. Although a certain degree of imperfection is intrinsic to 
any kind of market, excessively severe imperfections may prevent any market from operating. 
If LMF bonds prove too risky a financial tool, buyers will demand high discount rates. In this 
case, quitted members will have little or no incentive to sell their quotas, and they would have 
to accept the prospect of very long pay-back periods, often amounting to relinquishment of? 
their ownership rights. The feasibility of the market for LMF bonds and the regulation of its 
working mechanisms are the substantial difficulty but also the potential innovativeness of this 
approach.    
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